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FOREWORD 
Commonwealth Finance Ministers regularly meet to discuss inter-
national monetary questions and other financial matters of common 
interest during the week preceding the annual meetings of the Inter-
national Monetary Fund and the World Bank. For the September 1972 
meeting, it was apparent that reform of the international monetary 
system would be a topic of major importance, especially as some 
Commonwealth countries were expected to become members of the 
Committee of Twenty. With this in mind, the Commonwealth Secretary-
General felt that a study dealing with some points of special interest to 
developing countries, particularly those of the CommoIJ.wealth, would 
be of value: and guidance not only to the Finance Ministers in their dis-
cussions but also to Commonwealth Governments represented on the 
Committee of Twenty. 
This study was therefore commissioned by the Commonwealth 
Secretariat from Mr. A. F. -w. Plumptre, who for more than twenty 
years was in the Canadian Public Service. In 1965 he retired from the 
post of Assistant Deputy Minister of Finance in Ottawa, where he also 
served as an Alternate Governor of the Bank of Canada and of its 
Executive Committee. At the same time, he was an Executive Director 
of the World Bank and of the International Monetary Fund, and a 
Canadian representative on the "Group of Ten" at the official level. 
From 1965 till 1972, Mr. Plumptre was Principal of _Scarborough 
College in the University of Toronto. He was a Member of the High 
Level Group on Trade and Related Problems set up by the Secretary-
General of OECD in the autumn of 1971. He has now joined the Inter-
national Development Research Centre in Ottawa, of which he has been 
a Governor since its inception. 
The original study has been revised and clarified by Mr. Plumptre 
at a few points in the light of the discussions at the Commonwealth 
Finance Officials' and Ministers' meetings held in Lancaster House, 
London, from 19 to 22 September 1972. The views expressed in it 
remain his own, and are not necessarily those of the Commonwealth 
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I. THE EXCHANGE RA TE MECHANISM 
The present (Smithsonian) exchange rate arrangements are precarious. 
The necessarily urbane and balanced language of the Executive Directors 
of the International Monetary Fund in their Report on the Reform of the 
International Monetary System probably will not convey to many readers 
their actual precariousness. 
The Smithsonian readjustment of parities (and "central rates"), com-
bined with the widening of the margins within which actual rates are to 
be confined, is providing for some relaxation of tension. But the 
Bretton Woods system, so excellent and so helpful for so many years, 
is now deeply cracked: neither of the two reserve-currencies, neither 
the dollar nor sterling, is able to withstand the strains that have been 
laid on it; the link between the dollar and gold, which was central to the 
system has been shattered and neither gold nor the dollar nor (in its 
present embryonic form) the SDR can serve as an acceptable "neutral" 
foundation for the system; and, perhaps worst of all, the IMF system 
of determining par values, at least as between major currencies, has 
been weighed and found wanting. 
The Smithsonian arrangements effectively papered over some of the 
cracks. But the break-away of sterling within six months made it clear 
that (to use the phrase employed by the Executive Directors) the system 
is still "crisis-prone". 
The developing countries have as much, perhaps more, to lose from a 
disintegration of the system, and a breakdown of exchange-arrangements 
between the major devefoped countries, as those countries themselves. 
A breakdown of the post-war regime of expansionist liberal inter-
nationalism, with its relative freedom of access to expanding world 
markets for the staple export products of developing countries and its 
ability to provide at least a measure of development assistance in a 
variety of forms, could quite possibly revert towards the sauve-qui-
peut nationalist economic warfare of the 1930s in which the weaker 
countries, with less diversified economies and less sophisticated 
finances, are almost sure to suffer most. 
It is a common-place to observe that world commodity markets and 
world commodity prices react adversely to financial crises. It is also 
necessary to stress the particularly damaging effects on aid pro-
grammes and capital exports of the ever-deepening balance of payments 
crises. When a major country's balance of payments goes into heavy 
deficit, the external aid programme (for which domestic political 
support is likely to be chronically insecure) is almost certain to be 
amongst the early casualties: its growth (under the international 1 per 
cent target) is interrupted; it may even be cut back; and its quality is 
impaired by "tying';. Nor is there much evidence that countries 
experiencing heavy surpluses are disposed to apply them promptly 
and liberally to capital exports and ·other assistance to the developing 
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countries. On the contrary, the aid contributions of countries going 
into surplus are usually poor in both quantity and quality. A steady 
flow of capital exports and aid from the industrialized countries 
depends in very large measure on stability of balance-of-payments 
relationships amongst them. And, in the Bretton Woods system as it 
has developed over time, such stability .is by now conspicuously lack-
ing. 
There are unfortunate indications in the present situation of a pro-
pensity towards competitive exchange-rate depreciation amongst 
major industrialized countries. It is true that the ™F Agreement 
provides a measure of protection against the disruption involved in 
attempts at competitive depreciation; but it is surely too much to say, 
as the Executive Directors do, that it still provides "assurance" 
against such disruption, particularly if major countries are disposed 
to use the exchange rate in jockeying for position. Another aspect of 
the unsatisfactory exchange situation is the obvious reluctance of major 
c-ountries to revalue their currencies upward when, at least to outsiders, 
the situation would seem to warrant it. 
The phrase "at least to outsiders" brings out a point that is frequently 
mentioned, but perhaps not fully developed, in the Executive Directors' 
report: the concern of other countries in the exchange rate of any 
major country. Indeed there is prob-ably no country, h_owever minor, 
whose exchange rate is not of concern to one or more other countries 
whose export products are competitive. A greater recognition of 
the international implications and repercussions of exchange-rate 
decisions must be built into the new system. 
At the time of Bretton Woods there were few who would have challenged 
the doctrine that a national currency was a matter of national sovereignty 
and that such sovereignty related as much to the external (exchange:..rate) 
aspect of the currency as to its internal (monetary and central 
banking) aspect. This doctrine is embodied in Article IV of the ™F A 
Agreement which provides that a change in the par value of a currency W 
may be made "only on the proposal of the member" concerned; further, 
that provision is entrenched by Article XVII which precludes any 
•change in it unless that change is accepted by all members of the Fund! 
True, under Article IV, a member proposing to change the parity of its 
currency is obliged to "consult" with the Fund, but in the last analysis 
sovereignty is clearly national. 
The Fund may make, and in recent years has increasingly made, 
informal proposals to member countries about their exchange rates. 
But such proposals are informal and obviously carry less weight with 
countries in a "strong" position that they do with those in a "weak" 
position. 
The political doctrine that each country is naturally and completely 
sover~ign over the external (exchange-rate) value of its currency in 
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fact makes no economic sense. On the contrary, since each country's 
exports (whether visible, invisible, or capital) are some other country's 
imports, the outside world is equally concerned, along with the country 
itself, in movements of "its" exchange rate. The concern of the out-
siders is, of course, more diffused than the concern of the people in-
side the country, but it is economically just as large and just as real. 
It is a question for developing and for industrialized countries alike 
to consider how far to press the interest of the outside world in 
exchange-rate determination. For each country, any sacrifice of 
national sovereignty may incur risks. But it may equally involve 
advantages. For both developing and industrialized countries, economic 
decisions regarding exchange-rate changes are fraught with political 
difficulties. 
Some developing countries have, as yet, little experience of decision-
making in regard to the external (exchange rate) value of their newly-
independent currencies. They may do well to take a special interest 
in the range of proposals in the Executive Directors' Report, relating 
to "objective indicators" for exchange-rate determination, and also 
relating to the role of Fund initiative in these matters. No "objective 
.indicators" are likely to yield perfect or uncontroversial results in the 
determination of par values; but they are surely likely to provide a 
better basis, a better approximation to what is desirable in a world 
system, than decisions that are highly political in their nature and 
unilateral rather than multilateral in their purview. 
The Executive Directors' report indicates that developing.countries 
are generally resistant to the various proposals for more flexible 
exchange rates (parities) amongst the major industrialized countries. 
The same point emerges in resolutions of UNCT AD and other group-
ings of developing countries. However this is a point that deserves 
examination. 
Superficially, and prima facie, stable exchange rates as between the 
major markets for primary products hold out obvious short-run advant-
ages and conveniences for exporters to those markets. Movements of 
these rates, both actual and anticipated, introduce uncertainties which 
can be costly, whether in terms of some sort of insurance against them 
or in actual losses incurred in marketing. The fact that the marketing 
of many primary products involve contracts, not only externally 
between national marketing authorities and overseas buyers but also 
internally between such authorities and producers, accentuates the 
difficulties and discomforts, political as well as economic, involved in 
exchange rate instability. Thus, to the simple question whether stability 
is preferable to instability there can be only one answer. · 
But, in a crisis-prone international system, this question is surely 
not the right one; it is not a simple issue between stability and 
instability, between certainty and uncertainty. We live in a very 
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dynamic and hence uncertain economic environment and the question 
is not whether uncertainty should be confronted but rather how it should 
be confronted. In recent weeks the present author has repeatedly A 
posed, to authorities concerned with these matters in developing W 
countries, a question which is probably more nearly the right one: 
Since it seems that any attempt to maintain virtual fixity of exchange 
rates amongst major currencies over considerable periods of years 
nowadays entails the build-up of international financial crises, attended 
.by restrictions of various sorts, internal and external, interruptions 
'to external aid, and ultimate major movements of exchange rates, 
would not developing countries find preferable a system in which 
major exchange rates move more frequently but less violently, part-
icularly if such movements can be related in some way to "objective 
indicators" which are known and understood by all concerned? To this 
question, whether the smoother adjustment is not preferable to the 
c"risis-prone adjustment, the reply is always in favour of the smoother. 
It would be reasonable to assume that more frequent movements of 
major exchange rates, albeit moderate in extent, are likely to be a 
feature of the system of the future. Fortunately, the additional 
difficulties arising for developing countries in such a system, while by 
no means negligible, are at the same time not entirely insuperable. 
For example these countries are already fully accustomed to the use, 
in commodity markets, of hedging against future price movements;-
they may now be well advised to explore actively and fully various 
ways of mitigating the difficulties and uncertainties that are likely to 
be involved in exchange movements. Those developing countries 
whose financial systems have as yet made little provision for "forward 
cover" in exchange rates would be well advised to explore this matter 
forthwith. In view of the very great variety of situations in different 
international exchange and commodity markets, and the differing 
financial systems in different countries, what is needed is .expert 
advice and impartial techn"ical assistance adapted to the particular 
circumstances of each country. In the provision of such advice and 
assistance the Fund ought to be able to be helpful. The technical 
assistance facilities recently provided under the auspices of the 
Commonwealth Secretariat might also be employed. 
II. INTERNATIONAL RESERVES AND RESERVE CURRENCIES 
There is widespread support for the proposal that the SDR should be 
developed, as soon as possible, into an accepted, and generally 
utilized, world reserve asset. Such support seems, naturally enough, 
to be strong amongst developing countries. The emergence of such a 
"neutral" asset, under international control, could offer some escape 
from various objections and uncertainties. Politically, it is prefer-
able to avoid holding a reserve in the national currency of some other 
country. Economically, insofar as a country holds its reserves in 
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SDRs rather than in a reserve currency, it avoids the dangers 
attendant either upon the depreciation of that currency or upon the 
imposition of restrictions on its use. Unlike gold, which has in the 
past provided a form of non-national (neutral) reserve asset, SDRs are 
clearly under international control both in their creation and their dis-
position. Moreover it is conceivable that, in the future, contracts of 
various sorts, whether in commodity or financial markets, could be 
denominated in SDRs. 
The issues surrounding the development of the SDR, and its replacement 
of reserve currencies, have been very fully explored in the Executive 
Directors' Report, and in other studies. No attempt is made here to 
enter into the very complex and perhaps controversial issues that will 
arise if and when the time arrives to convert sterling-reserves into 
SDRs. There are, however, some points that may deserve emphasis 
and elaboration. 
The reserve-currency:system today apparently stands condemned 
both by those who use reserve currencies extensively in their inter-
national reserves (and they include virtually all developing countries) 
and also by those in London and New York who provide reserve-currency 
facilities. (In Paris people tend to condemn all reserve currency 
systems except their own). 
It is useful, indeed important, to distinguish between three different 
lines of criticism of reserve-currency systems. The first criticism 
is that reserve-currency systems, especially the dollar system, 
permit and indeed encourage inflationary enlargements of the total of; 
world reserves; these are generated by deficits in the balance of pay-
ments of the reserve-currency country and are thus beyond the scope 
of any control system, whether traditional (gold) or international 
(IMF). This criticism, it will be noted, relates to the total of world 
reserves; the other two relate to the movement of reserves between 
two or more reserve centres and the associated changes, or prospective 
changes, in the exchange rates between two or more reserve currencies. 
Thus, most of the users of currencies as reserves have been con-
fronted in recent years by substantial depreciations of "their" reserve 
currencies in terms of the currencies of such countries as Germany 
and Japan, from which their imports may be substantial and where they 
may have financial obligations. The providers of reserve currencies, 
on the other hand, have been confronted by exchange-crises resulting 
from massive outward movements of funds, both official and private, 
and by demands from official holders for guarantees in terms of other 
currencies. All three groups of critics look longingly to the emergence 
of SDRs as a means of reducing if not eliminating such problems. 
While one cannot quarrel with these attitudes, one may also be warned 
that the emergence of the SDR into a form in which it can fulfil all the 
tasks proposed for it will certainly take a number of years (see Section 
IV of this paper for an explanation of the legal and procedural issues 
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involved). All concerned will have to live with the reserve currency 
systems, or some modifications of them, until the new SDR system 
has been built and put fully into operation. 
In other words, the monetary authorities of developing countries are 
confronted by at least some years in which they will have to make , 
decisions, difficult but by no means impossible, as to how best to 
deploy their reserves, having regard to the possibilities of deprecia-
tion or appreciation of major currencies and the yield and liquidity of 
the various assets available in reserve centres. For some monetary 
authorities, these are relatively new issues, but they should be, in 
practice, quite manageable. Some monetary authorities may wish to 
obtain expert technical advice or assistance and, here again, help 
might be forthcoming under the auspices either of the Fund or of the 
Commonwealth Secretariat~ 
Lest, anyone, perhaps under French influence, should cast a nostalgic 
backward look at gold as a reserve asset it may be desirable to recall 
that the holders of earning assets in the form of reserve currencies 
have always come off better over the years than the holders of gold .. 
The very occasional increases in the oficial gold price have hever begun 
to compensate the supposedly shrewd holders of gold for the loss of 
interest that they suffer. In this regard, developing countries have 
been wiser and more far-sighted than others. 
In considering the general phasing out or phasing down of reserve 
currency systems it is helpful to distinguish (more clearly than is 
usually the case) between those that are "organic" and those that are 
"artificial". 
The original reserve currency system emerged organically between 
reserve-centres such as London, New York and Paris and their over-
seas dependencies. Each centre provided not merely the main source 
of development-finance for its overseas political or economic depend-
encies, but also a market for their staple products: New York for such A 
areas as Latin America and Canada, London for most of the British W' 
Commonwealth and Empire, and Paris for the French Colonial Empire. 
In the "developing countries", local banking facilities were often pro-
vided by branches of reserve-centre banks; and the reserves of these 
banks were held, for central as well as overseas business, in the 
reserve centre. The currency system of the developing country was, 
in most cases, an extension of the currency system of the reserve-
centre. And, as political and financial independence emerged, it was 
both convenient and sensible that reserves should still be held in the 
reserve-centre; not in gold nor in the currency of some other major 
industrialized country. 
The essence of the system was that the reserve-centre provided an 
important range of marketing and financial facilities to its overseas 
associates, much of their overseas income accrued in the reserve 





retain certain liquid assets in the reserve centre. It is clear that 
both the D-mark and the yen are emerging, albeit reluctantly, as 
"organic" reserve currencies. Thus the possibilities of shifting 
reserves between reserve centres are actually increasing. 
Entirely different is the reserve-currency system that has emerged 
in very recent years as between certain financial centres in industrial-
ized countries. Traditionally, the main European central banks held 
nothing but gold in their reserves, apart from minimal working balances 
held in New York and London. In the past decade or so, however, some 
of these central banks, and latterly the Bank of Japan, have become, 
unintentionally and often unwillingly, holders of very substantial amounts 
of U.S. dollars. The American authorities persuaded them to hold 
these dollars, rather than convert them into gold thus drawing upon the 
rapidly dwindling gold reserves of the United states. 
It will be seen immediately that this latter-day "reserve currency 
system" is both artificial and unstable. When the Europeans speak 
feelingly about the need to liquidate the reserve-currency system, and 
when they demand "convertibility" from the Americans, it is this 
system that they are usually thinking about. They consider that the· 
ability of the United States to obtain, in effect, massive short-term 
credit from abroad has not only relieved if of the monetary disciplines 
that normally force other countries to bring their balances of payments 
under control but has in addition made it possible for Americans to buy 
up or buy into large profitable sectors of European industry. To make 
matters worse, these artifical reserve-dollars constitute a vast 
inflationary addition to world monetary reserves; if the European 
central banks could have withdrawn gold freely from the United States 
there would simply.have been a transfer'.of gold reserves from one 
owner to another. 
European ire is not directed with anything like the same intensity, if 
at all, towards the traditional "organic" reserve currency arrange-
ments. Obviously, nobody would suggest that the total of world 
reserves has been inflated, or is in the leasf likely to be inflated, by 
the reserve-currency holdings of developing countries. The require-
ment that the reserves of the 'franc zone shall be held in Paris does 
not seem to be activeiy questioned. The gradual phasing-out of the 
traditional reserve-currency role of sterling has, however, been tied 
into the arrangements for the United Kingdom ;to enter the European 
Economic Community. 
The question of ''phasing out" can become a matter of definition: what, 
in the case of any reserve-currency holder, are properly considered 
to be "maximum working balances" and what are "reserve balances"? 
It may transpire that the mutual advantages of the traditional "organic" 
reserve currency systems (including the French) may be such that they 
will endure, in fact if not in name; for a longer time and on a larger 
scale than generally anticipated at this particular moment when anti-
reserve currency passions are running particularly high. 
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Of course arrangements would have to be agreed between reserve-
holders and reserve-suppliers as to what limitations could reason-
ably be placed on the size or use of official reserve (or working) 
balances. Some restraints on the international movement of official 
as well as private balances seem likely to be with us for some time to 
come. It is in nobody's interest that official balances, along with 
private balances, should rush from centre to centre aggravating 
exchange instability. However, in so far as a new exchange-rate 
system can be worked out (along lines suggested in Section I of this 
paper and elsewhere), the short-term incentives to move reserves 
from one centre to another should materially diminish, If, indeed, 
this turns out to be the shape of things to .come, any steps taken at the 
present stage by monetary authorities in developing countries to be-
come more adept and expert in deploying reserve assets, more or less 
permanently, as between several reserve centres will turn out to 
yield more lasting advantages than may today be anticipated. 
When a reserve-currency system is phased out or phased down in 
favour of some alternative reserve-asset, the question naturally 
arises: What rate of interest will the new asset yield? This question 
is being asked about SD Rs, particularly by developing countries which 
have traditionally regarded their reserve-currency holdings as a signi-
ficiant source of foreign-exchange earnings. This attitude has been 
strengthened in recent years because of the relatively high rates of 
interest paid on short-term liquid assets in both London and New York. 
The attitude of some developing countries toward the interest to be 
paid on holdings of SDRs has thus appeared to be "the higher the 
better". 
On this attitude two comments may be made. It is, of course, incon-
trovertible that interest earned on SDRs should relate in some degree 
to interest earned on reserve balances in London and New York, but 
this does not mean that, in order to make SDRs acceptable, the rates 
ought, broadly speaking, to be equal. On the contrary, relatively 
high interest rates in New York and London are in some measure a 
reflection of the weakness of the balances of payments of these two 
centres, the tendencies towards inflation in the two countries concerned, 
and the consequent erosion. of the value of the dollar and the pound. If 
the SDR is to serve as a stable standard of value it should, as far as 
possible, be immunized from the effects of inflation and currency 
depreciation. The yield that will make it attractive must be related, 
not only to high yields in U.S.A. and U.K., but also to the low net 
yields in Germany, Japan and Switzerland. Indeed, the preference 
for holding it rather than reserve currencies should relate to its 
stability at least as much as to its yield. 
Further, unless the SDR system is to change radically and in directions 
that seem unlikely, it will have to continue to be self-supporting, 
rather than subsidized. This means that the revenues to be raised by 
the IMF on account of the issuance of SDRs must be set against its 
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payments of interest to holders of SDRs; if the yield is to increase it 
would seem to involve an increase in the charge. In part these 
revenues will come, if and when holdings of dollars and sterling come 
to be converted into SDRs, from New York and London; but in part, 
and increasingly as the years go by, they will come, as at present, 
from those countries to which SDRs are originally issued each year. 
Since there are strong reasons to favour increases in the issuance of 
SDRs to developing countries (see the next section of this paper), and 
since these countries are most unlikely to retain all the SDRs that are 
annually issued to them, it may be questioned how far these countries 
have a strong interest in high charges related alike to issuance and 
holdings of SDRs. 
III. DEVELOPMENT AND THE LINK 
All of the major issues involved in international monetary reform are 
political as well as economic, and of none of them is this more clearly 
true than of the proposal to associate, to link, the issuance of SDRs 
and SDR-like assets with the development needs of the developing 
countries. To the ~uthorities of these countries the association seems 
sensible enough; with them the over-riding needs of development make 
if natural that financial institutions, including in many cases their 
own central banks, should be involved in provision for development 
requirements. But this,. of course, is just the point which gives rise 
to profound and sincere worries on the part of authorities in certain 
other countries who have staunchly defended the integrity of national 
monetary systems by drawing a firm line between the processes of 
creation of money and the insatiable demands of political leaders 
espousing worthy causes. 
Quite apart from any special issuance of SDRs based on the Link, there 
is at present opposition to any issue, or at least any substantial issue, 
of SD Rs in 1973. The reason advanced is that the total of wor Id reserves 
has, in the recent past, been greatly inflated; several countries have 
financed the balance-of-payments deficits of the United States by acquir-
ing large amounts of additional "unwanted" dollars. However, as the 
recently-issued Annual Report of the IMF Executive Directors for 
1972 makes abundantly clear, these additional reserves have come 
into existence under very peculiar circumstances, are held by a very 
few countries, and can scarcely be considered as a valid argument 
against continuation of the issuance of SDRs. 
Nevertheless, such considerations strengthen the view that if the Link 
is to gain acceptance (and there are increasing signs that it will), it 
must be in a form or forms that not only meet the basic requirements 
of the developing countries but also give reassurance to those countries, 
those authorities, whose attitudes are more traditional. Indeed, the 
developing countries themselves have a very clear interest in the 
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stability of the value of the new reserve asset; they are well aware of 
the damage to themselves that has arisen from erosion of the value of 
certain reserve assets in the recent past. Against this background the A 
following suggestions and comments are put forward in the hope that W 
they may prove helpful. 
One approach to the Link is for developing countries to press for 
another general increase in their IMF quotas that would go beyond any 
simultaneous increase in the quotas of other countries*. This approach 
has several attractions. It would not only, under the present system 
of SDR allocation, give to developing countries a larger share of the 
annual issue, whatever that may be, but it would also increase their 
access to financing from theFund, both regular and compensatory. 
Moreover, and this may be a point of some political interest, it would 
give the developing countries increased voting-power and, formally 
speaking at least, a stronger voice in IMF management, including the 
management of the SDR system itself. 
On the other hand it must be admitted that, within the framework of 
the relative quota increases that are likely to be found acceptable by 
other ·groups, the gains to be achieved from this approach are unlikely 
to be very substantial. Other approaches must be considered. And 
these, for the most part, would require a new rationale. 
One rationale for the Link which is to be found, amongst others, in 
the Executive Directors' Report on Reform of the Monetary System 
is that, because the developing countries will find the proposed system 
of more flexible exchange rates amongst major countries less comfort-
able, less easy to live with, than the relatively fixed parities of the 
past, they should be given a sort of consolation prize in the form of a 
Link. 
This rationale is not entirely satisfactory. If the new exchange rate 
system works better, is less crisis-prone, more favourable to orderly 
conditions in world exchange and commodity markets and to the pro- A 
vision of international aid than the system that we have come to know --
. in the last few years, it is a better system for all countries concerned 
- not better for some and worse for others. All should share, and 
should want to share, in setting it up and making it work. If, as the 
Executive Directors rather seem to suggest at one.point, the purpose 
of the Link is not economic development but merely to compensate 
those developing countries that need to establish facilities for forward 
dealings in exchange rates for the cost of doing so, the amount 
of development assistance to be justified on the basis of such a Link 
will be modest indeed. 
*At the time of the last quinquennial review of IMF quotas, those of 
the developing countries were accorded increases that were generally 
25 per cent greater than those of other countries. 
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There are other approaches that can carry more weight. One of these 
relates to a basic defect in the working of the present exchange mech-
anism to which reference has been made above. This is the apparent 
desire of industrialized countries, individually, to develop balance of 
payments objectives that are at present collectively incompatible. As 
the Executive Directors point out, industrialized countries are generally 
anxious to.plan for and achieve current-account surpluses; this anxiety 
is particularly evident in those countries confronted by unemployment. 
These planned surpluses, in aggregate, substantially exceed the present 
or probable provision by the countries for capital exports and for 
assistance to developing countries. Hence, there is a propensity 
amongst some of them to embark on competitive exchange depreciation 
and an unwillingness amongst others to revalue their currencies up-
wards. This situation already constitutes a threat to the stability of 
the international monetary system. It could be relieved by an enlarged 
flow of financial assistance to the developing countries from a multi-
national source, i.e. by the Link in some form. 
If this line of approach were to be followed it would be advantageous 
to all concerned for those reserve assets created for this particular 
purpose to remain fairly stable in-amount from year to year, leaving 
such annual fluctuations as are to occur in the issuance of reserve· 
assets to be absorbed by those to be distributed on some other basis, 
such as the present one. In this way the reserve assets created under 
the Link would provide a continuing and reliable basis both for develop-
ment planning in developing countries and for the achievement of 
balance of payments surpluses by industrialized countries. Moreover, 
if short-term fluctuations are confined to reserves distributed on other 
bases, the risk that those distributed to finance development under 
the Link will precipitate world inflation will be lessened. 
Another rationale which could be used in support of the same sort of 
approach to the Link lies in another defect in the present system, i.e. 
in the chronic deterioration of the terms of trade of the developing 
countries and their consequently diminishing capacity to finance from 
abroad their own developmental requirements. This adverse move-
ment of their terms of trade is clearly not the "fault" of the develop-
ing countries themselves_; indeed it is nobody's fault. But it impairs 
the capacity of the developing countries to stand on their own feet and 
purchase their requirements from the industrialized countries. Thus 
it hurts all types of countries, both developing and developed. A sense 
of justice can combine with a sense of expediency in a decision to 
allocate reserve assets to developing countries on this account. 
Without embarking on extensive statistical computations (which might 
well be undertaken by the IMF) it is not possible to suggest whether 
any quantitative relationship can be established between the amount of 
reserve assets to be provided on either of the bases outlined above. 
What is here suggested are two possible approaches, not a pair of 
yardsticks. 
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Another range of questions arises in relation to the way in which 
reserve assets, to be provided on the basis of the Link, are best 
distributed amongst the developing countries. In this regard, the A 
interests of different developing countries differ considerably. Many W 
would like·to receive such assets, as they now receive SDRs, without 
any strings attached as to their use. others, which for one reason or 
another are in a better position to make a case for assistance from 
development agencies (whether world-wide agencies like IDA or 
regional agencies) might think that their opportunities for development 
would be improved if the additional funds were channelled through 
these agencies. Moreover f it should be added that traditionalist 
opinion will be more likely to accept such channelling into approved 
development programmes and projects than to accept what might be 
considered a simple hand-out. 
The Link, and the issues surrounding it, will obviously be very extensively 
discussed and negotiated in the Committee of 20. It is quite impossible 
to tell, at an early stage, what form of Link will be most acceptable to 
others. 
It may, however, be of some relevance to recall, by way of conclusion, 
a point noted by Professor Triffin amongst .others. The present method 
of creating and distributing SDRs has no historical precedent either in 
the creation of international reserve assets (gold or reserve currencies) 
or in the creation of national reserve assets (central bank deposits and 
notes). Historically, reserves have come into existence in connection 
with investment-financing or deficit-financing. In the particular case 
of gold, the reserve-asset was created by investment in developing 
regions of the world, such as California, Australia, South Africa or 
Canada, but it was not retained in those regions. On the contrary, it 
was "earned" by the industrialized countries of the world which 
collectively ran balance-of-payments surpluses to acquire it and added 
it to their reserves. 
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL ISSUES 
The formation of the Committee of Twenty (C20) marks an important 
achievement and also an important opportunity for developing countries. 
It is an important achievement because other approaches to the reform 
of the world monetary system that were much less palatable to develop-
ing countries were being considered. The OECD apparently made an 
effort to play a central role, if not the central role, stressing the 
interrelationships between monetary, trade, and development matters 
all of which fall· within the purview of that Organisation. However, this 
proposal was dropped partly because the OECD is dominated by 
industrialized countries, to the virtual exclusion of developing countries, 
and partly because, amongst the industrialized countries, the European 
group is in a powerful majority position in that Organisation. Another 
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possibility was that the Group of Ten would play a leading role; but it 
was found to suffer from the same defects as the OECD, indeed in 
accentuated form. The UNCTAD resolution of May 21, 1972, gave 
strong positive support, from developing countries, to the C 20 
proposal and on July 28, 1972, the IMF was able to announce the 
approval of its Board of Governors. 
It is now important that developing countries should make full and 
effective use of the opportunities offered by C20. 
The first point on which to concentrate is the selection, by each of 
the several IMF "constituencies", of a member of the Committee of 
ministerial rank; each member may then appoint one or two "associates" 
on the Committee; he may also appoint one or two persons to the 
Committee of Deputies. If developing countries are to make their 
full and proper contribution to C20, all these choices must be made 
with care, bearing in mind that the Committee itself, at the ministerial 
level, will meet infrequently, perhaps two or three times in a year, 
and that the Deputies will meet much more frequently. 
The importance of the selection of committee personnel and the 
arrangements for their support must be re-emphasized. The dis-
cussions, the negotiations, that take place in C20_and its Deputies, 
will be wide-ranging in character and unpredictable in outcome. To 
be effective, Committee members will need to be both·competent and 
flexible. While it will be possible for a representative whose con-
stituency consists of a single country (e.g. U.K.) or at most 
three or four (e.g. Barbados, Canada, Eire and Jamaica) to con-
sult fairly frequently with his authorities "at home" regarding the 
complex and controversial issues under consideration, this will 
scarcely be possible for any representative whose constituency is 
more numerous. Moreover, precisely because of the controversy 
and complexity involved, the representatives themselves will have to 
give guidance and leadership to their constituents. 
As for staffing arrangements, it is anticipated that C20 and its Deputies 
will have a small staff of their own backed up, as may be required, by 
the staff of the Fund. It is not anticipated that Executi,ve .Directors of 
the IMF will generally serve as C20 Deputies; they have their own job 
to do. If an Executive Director is asked to serve as a C20 Deputy his 
task will be a heavy one. Similarly it is not expected that the Fund will 
provide the C20 staff; they, in their turn have their own jobs to do. In 
short, it is not intended or expected that C20 or its Deputies should be 
permeated or dominated by the existing Fund "establishment". They 
should have a life of their own if they are to make recommendations 
based on an independent as well as penetrating review of the world 
monetary system and related matters. This appears to be the wish of 
the developing countries concerned and they will, no doubt, be on the 
alert to ensure that their wishes are carried out. 
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It is also known to be the wish of some of the developing countries, 
perhaps most or all of them, that C20 should, at the outset, engage in 
a broad discussion of issues and outlook, including the interrelation- A 
ships between monetary affairs, trade, aid, and development. It W 
. shoulc:I: not become immediately immersed in details (e.g. proposals for 
'specific amendments to specific Articles of Agreement of the ™F). 
Indeed it has been suggested that the first year (1972-73) will probably 
be occupied in getting a reasonable measure of agreement on the broad 
outlines of what is to be recommended, and a second year (1973-74) in 
reducing these outlines to precise proposals. 
Amendment of the Articles of Agreement of the IMF requires a 
three-fifths majority of the member countries having a four-fifths 
majority of the voting power. Putting these requirements the other 
way around, any amendment can be blocked by anything more than two-
fifths of the membership and one-fifth of the voting power. Whenever 
contentious amendments come under consideration, the power to 
obstruct is clearly far greater than the power to progress. This is 
one important reason why the negotiations in C20 and its Deputies may 
be expected to extend over a considerable period. No group, such as 
the group of developing countries, will be willing to forego its power 
to obstruct until it is reasonably satisfied with the shape and size of the 
package as a whole including both those changes that require amend-
ments to the Articles of Agreement and also those changes of a sub-
stantial nature which. do not require such amendments. Moreover 
legislatures will be particularly concerned to see the whole package 
before accepting any part of it. A piecemeal settlement (e.g. the 
settlement of some issues by 1973 leaving others until 1974) would not 
seem to be at all likely. 
After C20 has done its work and made its recommendations, these 
recommendations not only have to be considered and (hopefully) 
approved by the Board of Governors of the ™F but, after that again, 
the legislatures of the member countries have. to act in sufficient 
numbers to fulfil the 3/5 and 4/5 requirements. Altogether, it is not 
surprising that people are talking in terms of four to five years as the 
time required for the work of C20 to be put into full effect. 
But the world's monetary and financial affairs show no sign of remain-
ing passive and uneventful until 1977 ! Many things,· important things, 
will happen during that period. This consideration p_oints to two con-
clusions as far as C20 and its Deputies are concerned. 
First, considering that the present system is not only crisis-prone 
but susceptible to general break-down, the work must be pressed for-
ward as a matter of high priority and with as little delay as possible. 
The zeal and efficiency of the chairmen, of the committee members, 
and of the staff, will be of great importance. Second, there should. be 
a "gentlemen's understanding" from the outset that countries - and 
this refers in particular to the major countries - will refrain from 
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taking actions, outside the consultative framework of C20 and its 
Deputies, which would prejudge and prejuaice the outcome of its 
work. This understanding should cover major departures from present 
arrangements whether or not those departures involve or imply amend-
ments of the IMF Articles of Agreement. 
In conclusion, it should be pointed out that, if C20 together with its 
Deputies works effectively and successfully, its establishment may 
set an important precedent. Ever since the Fund was established 
there have been those who saw the weaknesses, as well as the strengths, 
of having the Executive Directors serving full time and resident in 
Washington. While this arrangement made it possible for the Executive 
Directors to immerse themselves in the work of the Fund, it also made 
it impossible for them to participate in the day-to-day affairs and 
decisions of countries that they represented. 
The influential role in recent world affairs which has been played by 
"The Group of Ten" and by ''Working Party 3 of OECD" with which it is 
closely associated has depended, not only upon the fact that the number 
of persons involved was sufficiently small to allow for frank and 
effective discussion, but more particularly because the persons 
involved, both at the ministerial and official level, were continuously 
engaged in the decision-making processes of their capitals. It is clear, 
of course, that some of the IMF "constituencies" involve a consider-
able number of countries, and countries which cannot always speak 
with a single voice on issues of importance. Nevertheless, the 
establishment of C20 may be seen a-s offering an opportunity to bring 
important elements of planning and decision-making in world economic 
affairs back into the IMF where they would seem to belong, and to give 
developing countries the voice in these matters that they desire and 
deserve. These countries have a strong interest in ensuring that 
decision-making is kept in those international institutions like the 
Fund where they have an opportunity to be effectively represented 
rather than in institutions which do not include them. Thus, despite 
the difficulties which the developing countries (because they are 
numerous and diverse) will always face in obtaining effective representa-
tion in effective international bodies, it may well turn out that C20 
will come close,perhaps as close as practicable, to meeting their 
real requirements. 
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Commonwealth Economic Papers 
This publication is the first in a new series 
of papers on economic subjects of concern to 
Commonwealth Governments to be published 
from time to time by the Commonwealth 
Secretariat. 
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COMMONWEALTH SECRETARIAT PUBUCATIONS 
ECONOMIC 
Commodity Publications provide comprehensive and continuous infor-
mation on all aspects of the market situation for agricultural com -
modities. Although the emphasis is on Commonwealth countries, the 
coverage is world wide. 
Commodity Series (current 
issues of annual publications) 
Fruit No.19 
Vegetable Oils and Oilseeds 
No.20 
Dairy Produce No. 20 
Meat No.18 
Grain Crops No.14 
Industrial Fibres No.19 
Plantation Crops No.13 
Other Economic Titles 
Intelligence Bulletins (published 
quarterly/ monthly) 
Tropical Products Quarterly 




Meat and Dairy Produce Bulletin 
Wool Intelligence 
Tobacco Intelligence 
Flow of Intra-Commonwealth Aid 1970 
Organisation of the Tourist Industry in 
Commonwealth Countries (as at December 1971) 
Commonwealth Trade 1970 
Reform of the International Monetary System 
MEDICAL 




As part of its clearing house function the Education Division has published 
the following titles, which deal with a variety of issues in education and A 
related fields at both regional and Commonwealth levels: • 
Education in Commonwealth 
Education in the Developing 
Countries of the Commonwealth: 
Research Register 1970-71. 
School Building and Design in 
the Commonwealth. 
Special Education in the 
D,eveloping Countries of the 
Commonwealth. 
Youth and Development in the 
Commonwealth 
Youth and Development in Asia 
and the Pacific. 
Youth and Development in Malta. 
Youth and Development in Cyprus 
Forthcoming publications include: 
Selected Education Research. 
Approaches to the Employment Problems of Youth in 
Developing Countries of the Commonwealth. 
Commonwealth Periodicals Directory. 
Directory of Training and Social Development Programmes 
Mathematics Teaching in Schools. 
The Education and Training of Technicians. 
COMMONWEALTH INFORMATION PROGRAMME 
Publications prepared by the Information Division:- ·-
Commonwealth Diary, a listing of coming events (quarterly) 
Commonwealth Record, summaries of recent events (quarterly) 
Notes on the Commonwealth, reference papers on:-
Members of the Commonwealth 
Heads of State and Heads of Government 
The Commonwealth Declaration 
The Commonwealth Secretariat 
The Commonwealth Foundation 
The Commonwealth '-scientific Committee 
Particulars of prices and subscription rates and any further information 
required may be had from the Commonwealth Secretariat Publications 
Section, Marlborough House, London SWlY 5HX. 
·18 
© Copyright 1972 
Published by 
THE COMMONWEALTH SECRETARIAT 
To be purchased from 
THE COMMONWEALTH SECRETARIAT 
Publications Section 
Marlborough House 
London, SWl Y 5HX 
l.S.B.N. 0 85092 056 6 
Price 50p Net 
--• • 
